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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a novel system for detecting meaningful deviations 
in a mobile application's network behavior is proposed. The main 
goal of the proposed system is to protect mobile device users and 
cellular infrastructure companies from malicious applications. The 
new system is capable of: (1) identifying malicious attacks or 
masquerading applications installed on a mobile device, and (2) 
identifying republishing of popular applications injected with a 
malicious code. The detection is performed based on the 
application's network traffic patterns only. For each application 
two types of models are learned. The first model, local, represents 
the personal traffic pattern for each user using an application and 
is learned on the device. The second model, collaborative, 
represents traffic patterns of numerous users using an application 
and is learned on the system server. Machine-learning methods 
are used for learning and detection purposes. This paper focuses 
on methods utilized for local (i.e., on mobile device) learning and 
detection of deviations from the normal application's behavior.  
These methods were implemented and evaluated on Android 
devices. The evaluation experiments demonstrate that: (1) various 
applications have specific network traffic patterns and certain 
application categories can be distinguishable by their network 
patterns, (2) different levels of deviations from normal behavior 
can be detected accurately, and (3) local learning is feasible and 
has a low performance overhead on mobile devices. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network 
Operations – Network monitoring; H.2.8 [Database 
Management]: Database Applications - Data Mining; K.6.5 
[Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Security and protection – Invasive software (e.g., viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses). 
General Terms Security, Experimentation 
Security, Algorithms, Performance, Experimentation, 
Measurement. 
Keywords 
Mobile applications, Network traffic, Machine learning, Malware, 
Anomaly detection. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Along with the significant growth in the popularity of 
smartphones and the number of available mobile applications, the 
number of malware applications that harm users or compromise 
their private data has also dramatically increased. Furthermore, 
the significant growth of social networking and always-connected 
applications has caused a dramatically increasing influence on 
traffic and signaling loads on the mobile networks, potentially 
leading to network congestion incidents.  
Network overloads can be caused by either intended attacks or by 
benign, but unintentionally faulty designed, and thus "network 
unfriendly" applications.  Both the malware activities and the 
"network unfriendly" applications regularly affect the network 
behavior patterns and can be detected by monitoring an 
application’s network behavior. Thus, monitoring and analysis of 
network-active applications' traffic patterns is essential for 
developing effective solutions for the prevention of network 
overloads. 
The proposed system serves two purposes. First, the system 
allows protection of mobile device users form malware 
applications and second, allows for aggregation and analysis of an 
applications' network traffic patterns (to be used for development 
of solutions protecting cellular infrastructure from malicious and 
"network unfriendly" benign applications). Regarding the 
protection of users form malware applications, the new system 
supports two main use cases. The first case relates to the 
applications already installed on a device and the second, to the 
newly downloaded and installed applications. In the first case, the 
network traffic pattern of an application can be changed due to: 
(1) the changes in the user's behavior or (2) an application update 
to a new benign version or (3) a malicious attack. In this case the 
system’s purpose is to detect the deviation in the application's 
traffic pattern and correctly classify it to one of the three above 
mentioned reasons. In the second case, the system's purpose is to 
identify whether the new application is actually a modification of 
another application with some new (regularly malicious) behavior. 
For the above purposes the new system follows the hybrid 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) approach and is designed in 
the client-server architecture. The responsibility of the client-side 
software is to monitor the applications running on a device, learn 
their user-specific local models and detect any deviations from the 
observed "normal"1 behavior. The responsibility of the server-side 
software is the aggregation of data reported from mobile devices 
and the learning of collaborative models, which represent the 
common traffic patterns of numerous users for each application. 
The local models are used for detection of deviations in traffic 
patterns of installed applications; the collaborative models are 
used for verification of newly installed applications vs. the known 
traffic patterns.     
This paper presents the client-side of the whole system, i.e., the 
sub-system developed for the extraction of per-application traffic 
features, learning of local models, and detection of deviations 
from the normal user's behavior.  This sub-system (will now be 
referred to as system) is implemented as a regular Android 
application running on the OS user space and evaluated on regular 
                                                                
1 In this paper we use the term “normal” referring to the regular, 
non-anomalous observations and do not mean that the data are 
from the normal distribution in the statistical sense. 
(un-rooted) Android devices. The server-side of the system is 
currently under development and thus the collaborative model's 
learning and detection is part of our future research. 
In this paper we overview the system components, describe the 
extracted features, and utilize the machine-learning methods. We 
then describe the conducted experiments and present the 
aggregated data analysis and system evaluation results. The 
performed data analysis reveals that applications have very 
specific network traffic patterns, and that certain application 
categories can be distinguishable from their traffic patterns. The 
system evaluation experiments were conducted with a wide range 
of different applications, their versions, and several self-
developed and real malware applications. The results demonstrate 
that different levels of deviations from normal behavior can be 
detected accurately. Specifically, the deviation in up to 20-25 
percent of observations might be due to variations in an user's 
behavior or an application's diverse functionality; deviations in 
various ranges from 0 up to almost 90 percent of instances might 
be observed due to an application's version update; lastly, the 
deviations in 60 and more percent of observations are regularly 
caused by injected malware. In addition, the conducted 
experiment proves the feasibility of the proposed implementation 
and analyses performance overhead on mobile devices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
related work. Section 3 describes the client-side system 
components and methods. Section 4 presents the results of the 
evaluation experiment. Next, in Section 5 we discuss the achieved 
results. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future 
research. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Traditionally Intrusion Detection Systems are classified according 
to the protected system type as either host-based (HIDS) or 
network-based (NIDS) [1]. A network-based IDS is located on a 
central or distributed dedicated server(s) and monitors any number 
of hosts. Its performance is based on analysis of network related 
events, such as traffic volume, IP addresses, service ports, 
protocol usage, etc. Traffic monitoring is usually accomplished at 
concentrating network units, such as switches, routers, and 
gateways. On the other hand, a host-based IDS resides on and 
monitors a single host machine. Its performance is based mainly 
on an analysis of events related to OS information, such as file 
system, process identifiers, system calls, etc. [8].  
The current research work is unique in the IDS field in the sense 
that it proposes a host-based system whose performance is based 
on application-level network events solely. The anomalous 
behavior of an application is detected in real time on the device 
based on the observed network traffic patterns. This approach is 
justified by the fact that many malware applications use network 
communication for their needs, such as sending a malicious 
payload or a command to a compromised device, or getting user's 
data from the device. In fact, a recent survey of mobile malware 
reveals that about 70% of known malware steals user's 
information or credentials [7]. Such types of behavior influence 
the regular network traffic patterns of the application and can be 
identified by learning the application's "normal" patterns and 
further monitoring network events.    
Recently, with the dramatic increase in the number of malware 
applications targeting smartphones, various methods for intrusion 
detection on mobile devices have been proposed. A review of 
several such methods are presented in [2,18]. Most of the IDSs for 
mobile devices have focused on host-based intrusion detection 
systems applying either anomaly- or rule-based methods on the 
set of features that indicate the state of the device [17]. However, 
in most cases, the data interpretation processes are performed on 
remote servers motivated by limited computational resources of 
the mobile phone. Only a few of the proposed systems perform 
the learning or data analysis directly on the device [6, 10, 19] and 
even less have applied statistical or machine-learning techniques 
[10,19], even though such techniques are very popular and have 
been successfully used in traditional anomaly detection systems 
[8, 19].  Most of the systems either send the observed data to the 
server for analysis [2, 4, 12, 14, 16, 22] or perform the learning 
process offline on the server and plant the learned models back to 
the devices for the detection process [15, 17, 18]. Differently, 
from the earlier proposed methods, our system performs 
application-based anomaly detection using only application-level 
network traffic features while both learning and detection 
processes utilize the machine-learning algorithms and are 
performed on the device.  
Consider the earlier proposed systems where learning is 
performed on the mobile devices (as this is the most close to our 
work). The system proposed by Shamili et al. in [19] utilizes a 
distributed Support Vector Machine algorithm for malware 
detection on a network of mobile devices. The phone calls, SMSs, 
and data communication related features are used for detection. 
During the training phase support vectors (SV) are learned locally 
on each device and then sent to the server where SVs from all the 
client devices are aggregated. Lastly, the server distributes the 
whole set of SVs to all the clients and each of the clients updates 
his own SVs. Thus, although a part of the learning is performed 
on the device, the server and communication infrastructure, along 
with additional bandwidth load, are required. Our approach, 
though planned as a part of the wider client-server system, can 
perform and be utilized as a stand-alone solution running 
independently on each mobile device. Once more, authors 
evaluated their methods using the MIT Reality dataset [5] with 
manually injected symptoms of malware behavior and no 
estimation of resource overhead was carried out.    
Li et al. [10] presented an approach for behavior-based multi-level 
profiling IDS considering telephony calls, device usage, and 
Bluetooth scans. They proposed a host-based system which 
collects and monitors user behavior features on a mobile device. 
A Radial Basis Network technique was used for learning profiles 
and detecting intrusions. However, the system capabilities were, 
also, tested offline only using the MIT Reality dataset and its 
feasibility on mobile devices was not tested or verified.  
Therefore, our work is one of the first practical implementations 
of the machine-learning induction algorithm for mobile OS in 
general and for Android platform specifically.  
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
This section describes the main functional units of our system 
responsible for the online detection of traffic deviations on mobile 
devices. The system's architecture is presented in Figure 1 and 
consists of the following main components:   
Graphical User Interface (GUI) – is responsible for 
communication with user; presents the relevant information, 
receives the desirable parameters configuration, starts and stops 
the monitoring, etc.  
Alerts Handler – is responsible for presenting the alerts to the user 
interface and processing the user's response. 
Features Extraction – performs the measurements of the defined 
features at the specified time periods.  
Features Aggregation – computes the defined aggregations over 
all the extracted measurements for the specified time period.  
Local Learner – induces the local models representing an 
application’s traffic patterns specific for the user. 
Anomaly Detector – is responsible for the online analysis of an 
application’s network behavior and detection of deviation from its 
normal patterns.  
 
Figure 1. System architecture. 
In the following paragraphs we describe the four main logical 
components; Features Extraction, Features Aggregation, Local 
Learner, and Anomaly Detector modules. 
3.1 Features Extraction 
As mentioned above, the Features Extraction module is 
responsible for extraction (i.e., measuring and capturing) of the 
defined list of features for each running application at each 
defined time period. For this purpose it uses the APIs provided by 
the Android Software Development Kit (SDK). Below is a list of 
the currently extracted features: 
 sent\received data in bytes and percent; 
 network state (Cellular, WiFi or "No network"); 
 time (in seconds) since application’s last send\receive data; 
 send\receive mode (eventual\continuous) – derived from 
"since-last-send\receive-seconds", i.e., if the last send or 
receive data event was detected less than a specified number 
of second ago, the corresponding (send or receive) mode is 
continuous, otherwise it is eventual; 
 two application states – the first, specifies whether the 
application is in foreground or background and the second, 
specifies whether the application is among the active or non-
active tasks at the time of the measurement; 
 time in fore\background (in seconds and percent)  - total time 
that an application has been in fore\ background since the last 
monitoring of this application was started; 
 minutes since application’s last active\modified time. 
Additionally, the following features are planned to be extracted in 
the next version of the system: 
 number of total\concurrent connections of the application;  
 number of sent\received TCP\UDP packets; 
 number of sent\received TCP\UDP payload bytes; 
 number of sent\received TCP segments. 
The extraction time period is a configurable parameter. For the 
initial experiments with the system we set it to 5 seconds, 
however it is subject to change according to the results of future 
evaluation experiments. 
3.2 Features Aggregation 
The purpose of the Features Aggregation module is to provide a 
concise representation of the extracted application's traffic data. 
For this purpose, a list of various aggregation functions was 
defined. The instances of the aggregated data are used to induce 
machine-learning models representing an application’s behavior 
and for further anomalies detection. To get a notion of the 
usefulness of the various features for our problem, in the current 
work an extended list of possible aggregated features was defined 
and evaluated. According to the evaluation results, a preliminary 
list of the few most useful features is determined in the Evaluation 
Section. Below is a list of all the currently defined and aggregated 
features: 
 Average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of 
sent\received data in bytes; 
 Average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of 
sent\received data in percent; 
 Percent of sent\received bytes; 
 Time intervals between send\receive events - the send\receive 
events that occurred within the time interval of less than 30 
seconds from the previous corresponding event contribute to 
the calculation of the inner average send\receive time interval. 
The events that occurred within the time interval above or 
equal to 30 seconds from the previous corresponding event 
contribute to the calculation of the outer average send\receive 
time interval. Additionally, two types of intervals; local – for 
each specific aggregation time period, and global – averaged 
over the whole monitoring process, were calculated. The local 
time intervals describe an application's behavior at certain 
monitoring time points, while the global time intervals 
describe the application's general behavior observed up until 
the current point of time;  
 Network state - Cellular, WiFi, none or mixed. The mixed 
state was determined in the case where several different states 
(i.e., Cellular and WiFi) were observed during the same 
aggregation period; 
 Minutes past since application’s last send\receive data event; 
 Application state 1- foreground, background or mixed. Mixed 
state was determined in the case where several different states 
were observed during the same aggregation period; 
 Application state 2 - active, non-active or mixed; 
 Total and local time (in seconds) for which the application 
was in the fore\background state. Local time may vary from 0 
to 60 seconds and represent the value specific for the current 
aggregation interval, while the total time is aggregated over 
the whole application's active time period; 
 Minutes past since the application's last active time; 
 Days past since application's last modified time determined 
according to the application's installer file (i.e., ".apk" for 
Android) modification time. 
Similar to the extraction, the aggregation time period is a 
configurable parameter. For the current experiment it was set 
to 1 minute.  
3.3 Local Models Learning 
Our main goal in this paper is to learn user specific network traffic 
patterns for each application and determine if meaningful changes 
occur in the application's network behavior. This task relates to 
the family of semi-supervised anomaly detection problems, which 
assumes that the training data has samples for "normal" data 
examples only. These types of problems can be solved, for 
example, with one-class support vector machines (SVMs), the 
local outlier factor (LOF) method, or clustering based techniques 
[3, 13]. 
In this paper we decided to convert the semi-supervised learning 
problem into a set of supervised problems for which numerous 
well established and quick algorithms exist. For this purpose we 
follow the "cross-feature analysis" approach presented in Huang 
et al. in [9] and then further analyzed by Noto et al. in [13]. Both 
of these works have found this approach successful and useful for 
anomalies detection. However, [9], only considers features with 
discrete values and [13] mainly focuses on methods for combining 
the results of multiple feature predictors to make the final decision 
about instance normality. In our problem most of the features are 
numerical and an efficient implementation is desired as it is 
supposed to run on mobile phones. Thus, in this work we follow 
the general idea of the above approach; however, our 
implementation differs in several details. Both the general idea 
and our current implementation are presented below.   
The main assumption underling the "cross-feature analysis" 
approach is that in normal behavior patterns, strong correlations 
between features exist and can be used to detect deviations caused 
by abnormal activities. The basic idea of a cross-feature analysis 
method is to explore the correlation between one feature and all 
the other features. Formally, it tries to solve the classification 
problems   : {                   }  {  }, where {          } 
is the features vector and   is the total number of features. Such a 
classifier is learned for each feature  , where       . Thus, an 
ensemble of learners for each one of the features represents the 
model through which each features vector will be tested for 
"normality". The C4.5 Decision Tree algorithm was used for 
learning the classification model when the target class consists of 
categorical values. For learning the classification model for the 
numeric target attribute, several methods capable with numeric 
classes were evaluated. The evaluated methods and their results 
are presented in the Evaluation Section. 
3.4 Anomaly Detection 
This module is responsible for the online analysis of an 
application’s network behavior and the detection of deviations 
from normal patterns. The procedure utilized for testing each 
individual instance is further described.    
When a feature’s vector representing a normal event is tested 
against     there is a higher probability for the predicted value to 
match (for discrete features) or be very similar (for numeric 
features) to the observed value. However, in the case of a vector 
representing abnormal behavior, the probability of such a match 
or similarity is much lower. Thus, by applying all the features 
models to a tested vector and combining their result, a decision 
about vector normality can be derived.  The more different the 
predictions are from the true values of the corresponding features, 
the more likely that the observed vector comes from a different 
distribution than the training set (i.e., represents an anomaly 
event).  
For each predictor    we compute the probability of the 
corresponding feature value of a vector   to come from a normal 
event. This probability, noted                     is calculated 
as                        , where       is the predicted value 
and       is the actual observed value. The distance between two 
values for a single numeric feature is the difference in actual and 
predicted values divided by the mean of the observed values for 
that feature. If the difference is higher than mean value, the 
distance is assigned with a constant large value (such as 0.999). 
The distance for a discrete feature is the Hamming distance (i.e., 1 
if the feature values are different and 0 if they are identical). To 
get the total probability of a vector   to represent a normal event, 
we make a naïve assumption about the sub-model’s independence 
and multiply2 all the individual probabilities computed for each 
one of the feature values. A threshold distinguishing between 
normal and anomalous vectors is learned during algorithm 
calibration on the data sets with labeled samples. 
However, detection of abnormality in a single observed instance is 
not sufficient to determine whether that application's behavior has 
been meaningfully changed. Such sole anomalies can be caused 
by changes or noise in a user's behavior. In order to reduce the 
False Alarms rate and improve the effectiveness of the proposed 
system in general, we want to define a procedure which considers 
the consequent observations and derives a decision comprised of 
the individual predictions for each one of these observations. For 
example, an alarm can be dispatched only when an anomaly was 
detected in a certain number of consequent instances (i.e., 3 
consequent instances were detected as anomalous) or when an 
anomaly was detected in a certain percent of instances during a 
specified time period (i.e., 3 or more anomalies during a 10 
minute interval). The exact procedure has been determined 
according to our observations during the evaluation experiments 
and is described in the next section.  
4. EVALUATION 
This section presents the initial analysis of applications' traffic 
patterns and an evaluation of the proposed detection system. First, 
the research questions that we attempt to answer are described in 
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes the data collected for the 
experiments. In Section 4.3 we present the traffic patterns 
observed for several popular applications. In Section 4.4 the 
system calibration and evaluation processes are described, and the 
results observed for three types of the tested software; regular 
applications, self-written malware, and real malware, are 
presented. Lastly, in Section 4.5, the overhead of the proposed 
system on mobile phone resources is estimated. 
                                                                
2 In this paper we utilize this method due to its simplicity and 
computational efficiency, despite the known incorrectness of the 
underlying independence assumption. Utilization and analysis of 
more sophisticated methods is one of our future tasks.   
4.1 Research questions 
The performed evaluation experiments aimed to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. Is it possible to model an application’s network behavior so that 
any deviation from its normal behavior would be detected? 
2. Which network application-level features are most useful for 
modeling an application's network traffic patterns?   
3. Which classification algorithm is the most effective for learning 
the models and detection of anomalous behavior when most of 
the features are numeric values?  
4. What level of detection accuracy (and false alarms) could be 
reached using application level network-behavioral features 
only? 
5. How much overhead on mobile phone resources is caused by 
applying machine-learning and detection algorithms directly on 
the device?  
4.2 Data collection 
For the initial data analysis and evaluation of the proposed 
method, the Features Extraction module was installed and ran on 
the personal Android devices of eight volunteer users. During this 
period the applications' features were extracted and aggregated, as 
described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We have from 2 weeks up to 3 
months of data for each user. 
Additionally, we experimented with one self-written and five real 
Trojan malware applications. Each evaluated malware application 
has two versions: the original application asking for network 
access permission for benign purposes (such as displaying 
advertisements, best scores updated, etc.) and the repackaged 
version of the original application with injected malware code 
performing network connections for malicious purposes.  
For the self-written malware tests, the "Snake" game scenario 
from [17] was utilized. The benign application is actually an 
offline game financed through mobile advertisements and uses the 
network for the advertisements only. The infected version of this 
application is added with a background service which quietly 
takes pictures and sends them off to a remote server while the user 
is playing a game. 
For the tests with the real malware, five infected applications and 
their benign versions were utilized.  The infected applications and 
the corresponding versions of the benign application were 
retrieved from a repository collected by crawling the official and 
various alternative Android markets for over a year and a half. We 
used two applications injected with PJApps [20] Trojan; Fling and 
CrazyFish, two applications injected with Geinimi [21] Trojan; 
Squibble Lite and ShotGun, and one sample of DroidKungFu-B 
[11] malware found within the OpenSudoku game.    
The PJApps Trojan, which was discovered in applications from 
unofficial Android marketplaces, creates a service that runs in the 
background, sends sensitive information containing the IMEI, 
Device ID, Line Number, Subscriber ID, and SIM serial number 
to a web server, and retrieves commands from a remote command 
and control server. 
The Geinimi Trojan arrives on the device as part of repackaged 
version of legitimate applications. The applications repackaged 
with Geinimi Trojan have been found in a variety of locations, 
including unofficial marketplaces, file-share sites, and 
miscellaneous websites. When installed, the Trojan attempts to 
establish contact with a command and control server for 
instructions and once the contact is established, it transmits 
information from the device to the server and may be instructed to 
perform certain actions.  
The DroidKungFu-B is a version of the DroidKungFu malware. 
The initial DroidKungFu malware is known for its capability of 
rooting Android phones with OS 2.2 or below. The infected 
applications were found among alternative Android markets 
targeting the Chinese audience. The DroidKungFu-B version 
targets already rooted phones and requests for the root privilege. 
In either case (with or without the root privilege), the malware 
collects and steals the phone information (e.g., IMEI, phone 
model, etc.). 
The malware applications and their benign counterparts were 
executed on a specially designated device and their behavior was 
collected and analyzed. 
4.3 Data analysis 
This section presents the traffic patterns observed while analyzing 
the collected data of several popular applications with heavy 
network usage, such as Facebook, Skype, Gmail, and WhatsApp. 
Although the graphs are presented in two dimensions only, 
average sent vs. average received bytes, the distinguishable 
patterns of each application are clearly highlighted. The graphs 
representing the network behavior of the above applications on 
the devices of different users are presented in Figures 2(a-d) 
correspondingly. The data points of different users are plotted in 
different colors.       
 
Figure 2a. Facebook. 
 
  
Figure 2b. Skype. 
As can be seen from the graphs, each one of the analyzed 
applications has its own specific traffic pattern which is easy 
distinguishable from other applications. Note that on each of the 
graphs, the axis value’s range is different. Additionally, other 
features can be utilized for differentiation in less certain cases. 
 
Figure 2c. Gmail. 
 
Figure 2d. WhatsApp. 
Next, the two graphs presented in Figures 3a and 3b depict the 
behavior of different applications from the same type. Figure 3a 
depicts the traffic pattern of two e-mail client applications: Gmail 
and Android's native Email client. Figure 3b depicts the traffic 
pattern of two Internet browsers: Mozilla Firefox and device's 
native Browser application. Data points of different applications 
are plotted in different colors.  
It can be seen from the graphs that different applications from the 
same functionality type have very similar traffic patterns among 
them, while the traffic patterns of various application types are 
different. 
All the above observations lead us to the following conclusions: 
1. Modeling a mobile application’s network behavior using 
application-level features only is possible; 
2. The proposed approach is feasible: applications have certain 
patterns of their normal behavior, which can be learned so that 
any meaningful deviations from these patterns would be 
detected; 
3. Additionally, the observed network behavior of an application 
can be used to determine whether this application is what it 
claims to be, given that normal patterns of this application are 
known; 
4. Certain types of applications have similar network traffic 
patterns which can be used, for example, for traffic 
classification or hierarchical clustering of applications.  
 
Figure 3a. E-mail clients. 
 
Figure 3b. Internet browsers. 
4.4 System evaluation 
We conducted two types of experiments. The first type, which can 
be considered as a calibration experiment, served several 
purposes: 1) selection of optimal features subset, 2) evaluation of 
several machine-learning algorithms as our base learners, 3) 
determination of the minimal sufficient training set size, and 4) 
determination of the strategy for raising the "Anomaly" alarm in 
case one or more anomalous records are detected.  
For evaluation of different classification algorithms and features 
selection, the following standard measures were employed: True 
Positive Rate (TPR) measure (also known as Detection Rate), 
which determines the proportion of correctly detected changes 
from an application's normal behavior; False Positive Rate (FPR) 
measure (also known as False Alarm Rate), which determines the 
proportion of mistakenly detected changes in an actually normal 
application behavior; and Total Accuracy, which measures the 
proportion of a correctly classified application behavior as either 
anomalous or normal.  
The purpose of the second experiment type, which can be 
considered as a test experiment, was to evaluate the ability of the 
proposed system to distinguish between benign and malicious 
versions of the same application and between two benign yet 
different versions of the same application. Additionally, the low 
False Alarm rate on the data records of the same application 
version was verified. 
In this section we first describe the calibration experiments and 
their results followed by the test experiments and their results.  
4.4.1 Calibration experiments 
For the calibration experiments a set of 16 datasets were extracted 
and prepared from the collected data. Each one of the 16 datasets 
consists of train and test records. The datasets were selected and 
prepared in the following way. In half of the datasets (i.e., in 8 
datasets) both the train and test records were taken from the same 
version of a certain application. These datasets were used to verify 
a low detection rate on the records of the same application and 
determine the deviation level in traffic patterns that can be 
attributed to the application diversity and changes in a user's 
behavior.  In the other 8 datasets, train and test records were taken 
from different versions of a certain application. These datasets 
were used to verify the higher detection rate than seen in the cases 
with the same application version. However, in some cases, the 
low detection rate for the different application versions is 
acceptable, as different application versions are not obligated to 
contain any network related updates. For both, the calibration and 
test experiments, the train size for all applications was limited to 
the maximum of 150 instances, and the test size to the maximum 
of 400 instances. On datasets with fewer available examples, the 
full train and test sets were utilized.   
4.4.1.1 Features selection 
A wide range of features have been defined and presented in 
Section 3. However, extraction and aggregation of a large number 
of features on a mobile device is a very inefficient and resource 
wasting process. Additionally, learning classification models and 
detection with a large number of features is much more 
computationally expensive. Furthermore, the presence of 
redundant or irrelevant features may decrease the accuracy of the 
learning algorithm. Thus, our purpose in the features selection is 
to identify a minimal set of the most useful features. There are 
several groups of features among the defined list of aggregated 
features for which extraction and calculation is performed 
together using the same amount of resources. Thus, reducing one 
or a few features from such a group, while at least one feature 
from such a group has to be calculated, will not reduce the 
extraction and calculation overhead significantly. The standard 
approaches for features selection, such as Filter and Wrapper, are 
not applicable in this case, as they cannot consider the above 
described constraints between the features. For this reason, twenty 
feature subsets of various sizes and containing various groups of 
features were manually defined. The threshold distinguishing 
between the normal and anomalous vectors was defined separately 
for each one of the features subset in the preliminary calibration 
experiments, as it depends on the number and type of the involved 
features. 
4.4.1.2 Evaluated base learners 
Considering the prevalence of numerical attributes among the 
defined aggregated features, and the resource consumption issue, 
we decided to evaluate the following classifiers as candidates for 
our base-learner algorithm: Linear Regression, Decision Table, 
Support Vector Machine for Regression, Gaussian Processes for 
Regression, Isotonic Regression, and Decision/Regression tree 
(REPTree). The Weka [23] open source library was used for 
evaluation of these algorithms.     
All the defined feature subsets were tested with all the evaluated 
base learning algorithms on the calibration datasets described 
above. 
As was previously mentioned, sometimes abnormal instances can 
be caused by either changes in a user's behavior or by diversity in 
an application's functionality. In order to determine the acceptable 
rate of such abnormal instances in a normal application's behavior, 
we evaluated the possible range between 5 and 25 percent with 
step 5. Thus, the results of all the tested algorithms and feature 
subsets were evaluated for 5 different "anomaly acceptance" rates; 
5, 10, 15, 20, and 25. 
The results of the calibration experiments reveal the two best 
combinations of the base learning algorithm and features subset. 
The two best base algorithms are the Decision Table and the 
REPTree. The two best features subsets, presented in Table 1, are 
very similar to each other; one of the subsets includes all the 
features from another plus two additional features.  
Table 1. Selected features subsets 
Features Subset #1 Features Subset #2 
Avg. Sent Bytes Avg. Sent Bytes 
Avg. Rcvd. Bytes Avg. Rcvd. Bytes 
Pct. Of Avg. Rcvd. Bytes Pct. Of Avg. Rcvd. Bytes 
Inner Avg. Send Interval Inner Avg. Send Interval 
Inner Avg. Rcvd. Interval Inner Avg. Rcvd. Interval 
Outer Avg. Send Interval Outer Avg. Send Interval 
Outer Avg. Rcvd. Interval Outer Avg. Rcvd. Interval 
- Avg. Sent data Percent 
- Avg. Rcvd. data Percent 
As can be seen from the Table above, there are seven features 
included in both of the best subsets. Thus, we can conclude that 
these features are the most useful for modeling application's 
network traffic. 
As for the estimated algorithm accuracy performance, the 
Decision Table algorithm in conjunction with the features subset 
#1 and "anomaly acceptance" rate 20 percent results in TPR=0.8, 
FPR=0, and Total Accuracy=0.875 and the REPTree algorithm in 
conjunction with the features subset #2 and "anomaly acceptance" 
rate 25 percent demonstrates exactly the same accuracy values. 
For a better insight into the detection rate observed in the 
calibration datasets, the results of the Decision Table algorithm in 
conjunction with the features subset #1 and the REPTree 
algorithm in conjunction with the features subset #2 are presented 
in Table 2 (errors are marked in bold font). 
Table 2. Detection rate on calibration datasets 
Application 
Name 
Detected anomalous records (%) 
Decision 
Table 
REPTree 
Different application versions 
twitter 60.9 91.3 
 groupme 74.5 82.9 
gmail 5.0 11.9 
facebook 25.8 17.3 
twitter 1.6 26.0 
firefox 26.8 32.8 
whatsapp 29.2 44.4 
linkedin 32.0 48.0 
Same application version 
twitter 0.0 6.7 
facebook 1.3 3.9 
groupme 6.7 10.0 
gmail 16.0 8.0 
twitter 1.0 14.0 
firefox 20.0 20.0 
whatsapp 7.5 13.5 
whatsapp 10.5 6.5 
It can be seen that for most of the different application versions 
the detection rate is above the determined "anomaly acceptance" 
rate of 20-25 percent for both algorithms. At the same time, the 
detection rate on the test sets from the same application version is 
always below 20 percent. Thus, the detection strategy consisting 
of several steps can be defined as follows: 1) raise the "Anomaly 
Alarm" if at least 3 consequent abnormal instances are detected, 
2) raise the "Anomaly Alarm" if at least 3 abnormal instances are 
detected among the five consecutive observations, 3) raise the 
"Anomaly Alarm" if at least 3 abnormal instances are detected 
among the ten consecutive observations. According to this 
strategy, a system will raise an alert about any meaningful 
changes in an application's network patterns, including those 
caused by a version update. Further on the version update can be 
verified within the mobile OS and the Alert with the relevant 
information (including abnormal instances rate, whether a version 
update was detected and when) can be presented to the user. 
4.4.1.3 Training set sizes analysis 
An important question regarding the proposed detection system is 
how quickly the detection can be started (i.e., how many examples 
are needed for sufficient learning of the network traffic patterns)? 
To answer this question we evaluated the two winning algorithms 
using train sets of various sizes. This experiment was executed on 
all the calibration datasets, varying the train set size from 10 to 
100 or the maximum of the available instances with step 10, and 
from 100 to 400 with step 25.  
The results with both algorithms show that, in most cases, the 
train size of 30-50 examples is sufficient for learning a stable 
model which is able to determine the level of deviation between 
an application's traffic patterns correctly. However, it was found 
that in several cases, for such diverse applications like Facebook 
and Gmail, a larger amount, such as 80 – 150 examples, is needed 
for learning a stable model. Considering the fact that in the current 
experiments each data instance represents one minute of an 
application's network usage, we conclude that a relatively short 
time, varying from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours of network activity is 
required for our system to learn the patterns of a new application. 
Note that certain applications with rare network usage may 
actually require much longer time, while the required amount of 
network behavior data is aggregated.   
Additionally, we hypothesize that the minimal size of the training 
set required for learning stable models can be automatically 
predicted based on the meta-features of the observed data (i.e., 
range of values, variance, etc.) Investigation in this direction is a 
part of our future work.           
4.4.2 Evaluation results 
To test the proposed system, a set of other 12 datasets, 6 with train 
and test records from the same application version and 6 with 
train and test records from different application versions, was 
used. Additionally, the system was tested with one self-written 
and five real malware applications, as described in Section 4.2.  
The detection rate of the Decision Table and REPTree algorithms 
in conjunction with the features subset #1 and #2 correspondingly, 
on the evaluated datasets are presented in Table 3 (detection errors 
are marked in bold). 
It can be seen that for all the malware applications, the high level 
deviations (60-100%) were detected. Furthermore, deviations at 
various levels were detected in most cases when the learned 
models were tested with instances from a different application 
version. The undetected versions of Facebook and WhatsApp 
applications can be explained by very few or no network-related 
changes in the considered application versions. Additionally, the 
detection rate for all the cases when the learned models were 
tested with instances from the same application version are below 
the defined "anomaly acceptance" rate of 20 percent for the 
Decision Table algorithm and of 25 percent for the REPTree 
algorithm. Thus, using the Decision Table algorithm's "anomaly 
acceptance" rate of 20 percent, the estimated method's accuracy 
on the test data is the following: TPR=0.82, FPR=0.0 and Total 
Accuracy=0.875. For the REPTree algorithm with the determined 
"anomaly acceptance" rate of 25 percent, the estimated accuracy 
on the test data is even higher: TPR=0.91, FPR=0.0, and Total 
Accuracy=0.94. 
Table 3. Detection Rate on test datasets 
 
Application 
Name 
Detected anomalous records (%) 
Decision Table REPTree 
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Different versions 
twitter 57.8 62.2 
twitter 78.2 34.8 
facebook 0.5 3.3 
groupme 80.9 87.2 
whatsapp 16.7 28.9 
Same version 
groupme 0.0 0.0 
groupme 0.0 15.0 
gmail 14.8 22.2 
facebook 16.0 15.7 
firefox 20.0 22.8 
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Self-written malware 
Self-written malware 
Self-written malware 
Snake 100.0 100.0 
Real malware 
Same application version 
Same application version 
Fling 63.6 66.8 
OpenSudoku 100.0 100.0 
ShotGun 97.0 89.5 
Squibble 90.0 95.0 
Crazy Fish 100.0 100.0 
Consider the surprisingly high detection rate in the several real 
malware applications. Note that in the self-written malware the 
100% detection rate is not surprising, as the benign and malicious 
versions are significantly different in their network usage patterns. 
However, in the case of the real malware applications, the 100% 
detection rate is not obvious. In the applications infected with the 
Trojans, the main application's functionality is preserved and 
some new functionality is added. Thus, some part of the data 
related to the old functionality might be expected to remain 
unchanged. This is actually the case with the Fling application 
where online mobile advertisements are displayed while the 
application is in the phone's frontend in both versions. Thus, the 
records corresponding to the time when the game was actually 
played were less affected by the Trojan functionality and thus the 
observed detection rate is "only" 60%. Analysis of the data 
aggregated from the benign and malicious versions of the 
evaluated applications shows that the significant differences are 
caused by a background process that is running even when an 
application is not active and performs multiple connections (or 
connection attempts) with the server at constant time intervals. 
This behavior has a significant effect on such features, such as 
avg. sent\received bytes, number of sent\receive events, global 
outer\inner sent\receive intervals, and others. Most of the 
mentioned and significantly influenced features are contained in 
the utilized features subsets and this explains the high detection 
rate.    
4.5 Resources Overhead 
This section evaluates the overhead caused by the learning and 
detection processes on mobile phone resources in terms of 
memory consumption, CPU load, and time needed for a model's 
induction and vector testing processes. Experiments were 
performed on a Samsung Galaxy S GT-i9000 running Android OS 
version 2.2. One of the selected combinations, the REPTree 
algorithm in conjunction with the features subset #2, was used for 
the overhead evaluation experiments.   
Note that online monitoring is performed for network-active 
applications only. Generally there are no more than 2-3 such 
applications running simultaneously on a device most of the time. 
Additionally, we assume that during the time periods of a user's 
normal activity, the number of such applications may reach no 
more than 10 – 15 network-active concurrent processes. Thus, for 
performance estimation, we consider a scenario of 10 
concurrently monitored applications. We estimate the memory 
and CPU load for learning the 10 application models and further 
constant monitoring of their network traffic. For a better 
estimation of memory consumption, the results were averaged 
through 10 distinct experiments.  
4.5.1 Memory consumption 
The memory consumption of the application changes in intervals 
from 7,035 KB±8 before the learning process has started to 7,272 
KB±15 after storing the 10 learned models in memory (which is 
approximately 1.4% of the device’s RAM). Storage of each 
additional model in memory consumes about 24 KB±0.7 on 
average. For comparison the memory consumption observed for 
several constantly running Android services and other popular 
applications is presented below: Android System – 24,375 KB; 
Phone Dialer – 8,307 KB; Antivirus – 7,155 KB; TwLauncher – 
22,279KB; Email – 10,611 KB; and Gmail – 9,427 KB. The 
detection process has no effect on the consumed memory.   
4.5.2 CPU consumption 
The CPU consumption peaks occurred at the times of the actual 
model's learning and were in the interval of 13% ±1.5. Note that 
model's learning operations occur very rarely, either when a new 
application is installed or when a model's update is needed (due to 
a new application version or changes in user's behavior). The CPU 
consumption observed during the process's idle time was in the 
interval of 0.7% ±1.02. Time needed to learn a model (using 50 
training examples) varies in intervals of 249 msec. ± 27.4. 
The time needed for testing a single instance varies in intervals 
3.6 msec. ± 2.5. Recall that aggregated features vectors are tested 
once at the defined aggregation time interval (one minute for these 
experiments). The CPU consumed by testing 10 concurrent 
instances (one for each one of the assumed active applications) 
varies in intervals of 1.8% ± 0.8.  
Note that the results of this experiment depict the resources' 
overhead caused during the user's high activity time periods. 
During the, presumably much longer time periods of the user's 
normal activity, an even lower overhead is expected.   
4.6 Discussion   
In this section the defined research questions are discussed in light 
of the experimental results. 
Considering the first question, it has been shown that modeling a 
mobile application’s network behavior using application-level 
features only is possible and that the proposed approach is 
feasible; patterns of the normal application's behavior for an 
application can be learned and then any meaningful deviations 
from these patterns can be accurately detected. 
In regards to the second question, 7 network application-level 
features were found as the most useful for modeling an 
application's network traffic patterns. Some further fine tuning 
evaluations to add\remove certain features could probably slightly 
improve the achieved results. 
As for the most effective classification algorithm to be used as a 
base-learner in the "cross-feature analysis" approach, the REPTree 
and Decision Table algorithms were found to be the most 
successful. The high detection accuracy utilizing these algorithms 
was confirmed on the test data as well.  
Considering the forth question, it was shown that a high True 
Positive Rate along with zero False Alarms could be achieved 
using the selected classification algorithms and features subset. 
An interesting question for future research is whether this 
accuracy could be improved using the network-level features in 
addition to the currently selected features?  
We have also demonstrated that the proposed online learning and 
detection has relatively low overhead on the mobile phone 
resources, comparatively to the resources consumed by other 
permanently running services, and thus is acceptable for running 
on smartphones. Unfortunately, we could not evaluate the 
Features Extraction and the Aggregation processes’ impact on the 
mobile phone resources due to the fact that an extended list of 
features was observed and calculated. In our future work we plan 
to re-implement the Features Extraction components retaining 
only the most effective features and thus the performance 
overhead of the whole system can be determined.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented a novel system for detecting 
meaningful deviations in a mobile application's network traffic 
patterns. The presented system, although initially planned as a 
host-based part of a larger hybrid (i.e., client-server) system, is a 
fully-functioning stand-alone monitoring application for mobile 
devices, which can be used alone or in conjunction with other 
methods. One of the main capabilities of the proposed system is 
protection of mobile device users form malicious attacks on their 
phones. The detection is performed based on the application's 
network traffic patterns only.  
Machine-learning methods were used for learning and detection 
purposes. This work represents one of the first attempts to run 
learning and detection processes on the device itself which 
demonstrates the feasibility and acceptable resources overhead of 
the proposed method. Although the overhead of the Features 
Extraction process was not yet measured, this is an unavoidable 
part of a host-based system, and thus those processes should be of 
maximal efficiency in any case. An estimation of the overhead of 
the whole system is one of our upcoming tasks.    
Experimentally a subset of few network application-level features 
most useful for modeling traffic patterns were identified among 
the wide range of the extracted and aggregated features. 
Additionally, several classification algorithms suitable for 
handling numerical data were evaluated and the two most 
effective methods were selected. Moreover, the traffic patterns of 
several popular applications were presented and analyzed. It was 
shown that many applications have very specific network traffic 
patterns and that certain application's categories can be 
distinguishable from their network traffic patterns.  
Results of the evaluation experiments conducted with different 
benign and malware applications demonstrate that a high True 
Positive Rate along with low False Alarms could be achieved 
using the proposed method. Specifically, it was shown that 
different levels of deviations from normal behavior can be 
detected accurately. Thus, the deviations in up to 20-25 percent 
were observed in tests with the same application versions. These 
deviations can be explained by different user's behavior and the 
diverse functionality provided by certain applications. Deviations 
in various ranges from 0 up to almost 90 percent of instances 
might be observed in the different application's version. Such a 
wide deviations range is explained by different levels of network 
related changes in the new versions. The deviations in 60 and 
more percent of records were observed in the applications 
containing an injected malware. Summarizing the results of the 
presented research work, we conclude the proposed method is 
feasible and effective for the detection of different deviation 
levels in the application network patterns.  
Some of our main future research directions are: verifications on 
whether the detection accuracy can be improved using other 
application- and network-level features; automatic prediction of 
the minimal training set size sufficient for learning stable models, 
based on the meta-features of the observed data; development and 
analysis of methods for a collaborative model's learning and 
detection.  
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